Abstract: Since 2001, governments in Canada and the United Kingdom appear to have increasingly sought to use secret evidence in proceedings against individuals suspected of posing a security threat, relying on the courts to review and legitimate executive claims in closed proceedings. Yet, in the face of secret evidence, adjudicative decision-making is subject to several extraordinary weaknesses. First, the judge is precluded from hearing additional information that can come to light only if the individual or the public is aware of the executive's claims. Secondly, courts are uniquely reliant on the executive to be fair and forthcoming about confidential information and to characterize accurately the case for secrecy. Thirdly, the dynamic or atmosphere of closed proceedings may condition a judge to favour unduly the security interest over priorities of accuracy and fairness. Even where the use of secret evidence is not deemed to be irreparably unsafe or unfair, therefore, its admissibility must be premised on the acknowledgement and careful consideration of corresponding weaknesses in adjudication.
Introduction
Secrecy is the source of a contradiction in the democratic state. While secrecy may be essential to the state's ability to ensure security, it also prevents citizens from making informed choices about how they wish to be governed.
1 Secrecy may be essential has the potential to infect the adjudicative process where secret evidence 6 is relied on, purportedly for security reasons, in proceedings that affect an individual. Since 2001, governments appear to have increasingly resorted to secret evidence in cases against those suspected of involvement in terrorism and, as a result, courts have been asked in closed proceedings to validate executive claims that an individual poses a security threat. 7 Such proceedings entail judicial review both of confidential information supplied by the state and of the state's arguments for secrecy. The aim of this article is to examine the limitations of adjudication in the face of secret evidence. The argument is pitched at the level of general principle and it does not aspire to provide comprehensive treatment of existing case law in the UK or Canada. Its reasoning is informed more eclectically by a distillation of academic research and analysis, relevant case law, and the author's own experience in the conduct of closed proceedings.
It is accepted here that it is appropriate for courts to decide whether secret evidence should be allowed in judicial proceedings and, in turn, to assess secret evidence against the applicable legal standards. In some contexts, especially that of a criminal trial, constraints arising from secrecy will call for an adjudicator to bar such evidence and to require the executive either to disclose the information or to withdraw claims based on it.
In other contexts, it may be desirable or permissible to admit secret evidence in light of such factors as the centrality of the evidence to the underlying case, the degree of impact on the individual's rights or interests, and the utility and effectiveness of available procedural adaptations. Once an initial decision is made that allowing secret evidence is not irreparably unsafe or unfair, the courts must turn to more specific issues of relevance, 6 'Secret evidence' is evidence to which the affected individual (and the public) is denied access;
'closed proceedings' are legal proceedings that permit secret evidence. reliability, probity, and admissibility, and must scrutinize more precisely the rationales for secrecy so as to decide whether and how portions or aspects of the information can be disclosed to the affected individual or the public. 8 In the course of a more detailed review, it may become apparent that the required level of secrecy is such that the original decision to allow a closed proceeding to go forward should be revisited.
In considering secret evidence, the courts confront three key limitations. First, the judge is foreclosed from hearing additional information and argument that can come to light only if the affected individual or the public is made aware of the executive's claims or the underlying record of confidential information. Secondly, in closed proceedings, courts are especially reliant on executive officials to supply and characterize confidential information and to justify the case for secrecy. Thirdly, the dynamic of closed proceedings in the security context may condition judges to favour unduly the interests of secrecy and security. These limitations do not necessarily reflect inherent weaknesses of courts although they do require that in some legal contexts -in light of the nature of the evidence and the individual rights or interests at stake -secret evidence must be barred outright. On the other hand, where the consequences for an individual are less serious, there is an important role for adjudicative review of the security activities of the state and, by extension, for secrecy. This role for adjudication as an accountability mechanism should be endorsed only after consideration of the full range of limitations that follow from the use of secret evidence. 9 8 I. Leigh, 'Secret Proceedings in Canada ' (1996) 34 Osgoode Hall LJ 113 at 154. 9 The authority of courts or other adjudicators to scrutinize executive decisions is also at times limited, both in intensity and scope, by the application of a narrow standard of review or standard of proof, or by the specified grounds for overturning decisions: Constitutional Affairs Committee,
The operation of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) and the use of Special
Advocates ( Although not the focus of the present article, this attenuation of adjudicative review raises additional issues concerning the accuracy and fairness of adjudicative decisions that are based on
Adjudicative Context
In recent years, the use of secret evidence in adjudicative proceedings involving individuals accused or suspected of posing a security threat appears to have been revived and intensified. Without undertaking systematic empirical analysis, this section briefly outlines indicative aspects of the present use of secret evidence for national security reasons in the UK and Canada and its judicial review.
A. Contemporary uses of secret evidence
The underlying rationales for national security confidentiality have not changed conceptually since 2001. These rationales arise mainly from the state's need to protect the identity of informers in order to facilitate the gathering of human source intelligence, to prevent the state's investigative activities and methods from being revealed to those who pose a security threat, and to honour commitments made to foreign governments as a condition of information sharing. These rationales are well known and widely accepted as providing legitimate bases for secrecy, while also raising the prospect of exaggeration and abuse. What has changed since 2001 is the sense of urgency that is attached to relevant threats and also, it would appear, the extent to which secret evidence may be introduced in proceedings against an individual. 10 This article leaves aside the extraordinary measures adopted by the US government, including practices of rendition secret evidence. Suffice it to say that such issues are another factor to consider in determining whether the limitations inherent in closed proceeding can be ameliorated by procedural adaptations designed to accommodate secret evidence. However, even within a highly interventionist framework of judicial review, the use of secret evidence raises nonetheless the limitations identified in the present article. 
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and extra-judicial imprisonment, 11 in order to highlight responses in the UK and Canada that are not extra-judicial, but still irregular and troubling in their reliance on closed proceedings.
The baseline for further analysis is that the overarching prohibition on secret evidence in criminal proceedings remains well entrenched in the UK and Canada in that the courts retain the authority to decide whether the public interest calls for disclosure of evidence to an accused in order to protect the right to a fair trial. That right itself rests fundamentally on the accused's ability to know the case against him or her and to answer that case by testing the evidence and offering evidence and argument in reply. 12 In the criminal context, dangers posed by secrecy to accuracy and fairness are often regarded as irreparable. Secrecy may be permitted in the investigation of alleged crimes in order to authorize investigative techniques aimed at acquiring disclosable evidence for trial, but it is rarely if ever tolerated at the trial itself. 13 In contrast, secret evidence has been allowed in other contexts, including some that lead to long-term detention, most importantly (in the UK) in proceedings to determine whether a suspected terrorist may be detained on preventive grounds and (in both the UK and Canada) in proceedings to determine whether a foreign national may be detained because he or she is believed to pose a security threat. It is important to bear in mind the variety of procedural contexts in which the legitimacy of secret evidence may fall for consideration. Although secret evidence is entirely inappropriate in some contexts, in others it may be unavoidable or desirable as a means to facilitate independent review of the workings of hidden government. The circumstances for and implications of secret evidence also vary depending on the factual and legal issues at stake. Procedural adaptations of adjudication designed to accommodate secret evidence may be correspondingly flexible. The question is not simply whether it is appropriate to allow secret evidence, however vital that question may be. In some circumstances, it is also important to consider how to adapt the process on an informed and self-conscious basis where the use of secret evidence is not deemed to be irreparably unsafe or unfair.
B. Judicial Review
Since 2001, the legal terrain for secret evidence has been characterized by greater reliance on the courts to approve decision-making processes that involve closed proceedings and, in turn, to review and legitimate executive claims in such proceedings.
In the UK and Canada, the use of secret evidence remains subject to review by courts or by specialized tribunals whose decisions may in turn be challenged in the courts. 30 A(FC), above n. 12 at para 100 (Lord Hope) and para 155 (Lord Scott). 
The Weaknesses of Adjudicative Review in Closed Proceedings
The conflict of interest that is inherent in hidden government presents a major concern for adjudication because of the ways in which secrecy tends to undermine truth-seeking.
Three weaknesses in particular confront courts when faced with secret evidence. The first weakness arises from the denial of access to the evidence by the affected individual and by the public. The second arises from the courts' dependence on executive agencies, including foreign governments, to supply and characterize the confidential information from which secret evidence is drawn. The third arises from the adjudicative dynamic that 33 Above n. 31. 34 Charkaoui No. 1, above n. 31 at para 3. 35 Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997, s 6(1); SIAC Rules, rule 35.
secrecy generates in the security context, which may condition a judge over time to favour secrecy over disclosure. Each of these limitations is now examined.
A. The absence of the individual and the public
The first set of limitations in closed proceedings arises from the inability of the individual to present a reply to claims against him or her by probing or elaborating upon the record and by presenting an informed counter-argument. The court is deprived of the fruits of a counter-investigation by the affected individual in response to the executive's case. 36 The court will not hear exculpatory evidence that the individual alone may be in a position to supply or uncover. 37 State witnesses will not be subjected to cross-examination in contradiction of the venerated principle that evidence must be open to denunciation by the opposing party. Further, the court is denied the benefit of hearing a properly informed argument from the individual. Thus, core safeguards of the adversarial process are lost.
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In the absence of the individual party, the judge in a closed proceeding may be compelled to challenge more directly the executive's case on behalf of the individual. 39 44 In recognition of these limitations to adjudicative review arising from the absence of the individual, the regimes for secret evidence in both the UK and Canada provide for the appointment of a surrogate counsel, known as a special advocate, to represent the individual in closed proceedings. This procedural adaptation to secret evidence is discussed briefly in the conclusion of this paper.
accused in order, for example, to enable a vulnerable witness to testify, to protect the identity of a confidential informer, or to protect national security. But however significantly these doctrines may affect the determination of guilt or innocence in a criminal proceeding, the cloak of secrecy that they extend is more limited than in other security-related proceedings. First, it does not extend to the actual evidence adduced at trial in support of the Crown's case or to the allegations directed against the individual.
Second, it is subject to tight controls requiring the withdrawal of the charge by the Crown or dismissal of the case by the court, where the evidence goes to a central issue in the trial.
Consider the Canadian approach to informer privilege in criminal proceedings. In such proceedings, the identity of an informer may be withheld from the accused where the information supplied by the informer was given to police on the express or implied condition that the informer's identity be shielded by the executive. 45 This is so despite the fact that disclosure of the contents of such evidence or aspects of its origins (such as financial or other incentives given to the informer by the executive) would better enable the individual to understand and respond to the executive's claims. 46 Informers may have reason to fabricate or embellish information they provide, for example in order to avoid prosecution or deportation, 47 and, without knowing the identity of an informer, an individual cannot identify reasons -of which he or she may be uniquely aware -that cast 45 R v Leipert [1997] 1 SCR 281 at para 9-12. 46 To illustrate, the content of a tip by an informer that a person attended a meeting of an organization on a specific date would typically require protection in order not to reveal the source, whereas the content of a tip that the person is believed to be a member of the organization might be disclosed without this danger. On the other hand, informer privilege is restricted to information that arises in the course of the investigation of an offence, and does not extend to information introduced as actual evidence at trial. The purpose of information derived from a confidential informer is typically to allow the police to show reasonable and probable grounds to obtain a search warrant. The confidentiality of tips thus serves as a means to obtain other, disclosable evidence for use at trial. While the identity of the tipster whose information provided the basis for a warrant may be kept confidential, evidence derived from the search will be disclosed to the accused. Moreover, even at the investigative stage, the courts emphasize the need for careful scrutiny of information supplied by confidential informers where the information supports a search warrant application. 49 The Supreme Court of Canada has indicated that a "bald conclusory" tip by an informer is insufficient to demonstrate reasonable and probable grounds for a warrant and has emphasized that information from a confidential informer must be compelling, credible, and corroborated by a police investigation before the courts will authorise a search. Also, where the credibility of the informer cannot be assessed because the informer is anonymous or untried, this must be compensated by the quality of the information and corroborative evidence. information relating to informer privilege is thus approached with caution at the investigative stage and subject to disclosure if relied on at trial.
In contrast, in other security-related proceedings -including UK control order and
Canadian security certificate proceedings -there is broad scope for the use of testimony (including hearsay) derived from confidential informers as part of the evidentiary foundation for the state's case. In the security field, human intelligence sources commonly do not take the stand even in a closed proceeding and so they are never questioned directly and under oath about their version of events. Instead, a security official testifies as to the source's story or, in some cases, presents information drawn from a report from the field officer who had contact with the informer, but who also may never testify under oath. In such circumstances, the risk of error or abuse is magnified greatly from that in a criminal trial where the evidence adduced will be disclosed, although it was derived from a search that was triggered originally by a confidential tip.
Both criminal and non-criminal proceedings share a common security-based rationale for attempting to balance the competing interests in confidentiality and disclosure, but they achieve that compromise in very different ways.
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A second example can be found in the approach to claims of public interest immunity in criminal proceedings in England and Wales as examined in decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). 52 The immunity is typically asserted as a basis for restricting the duty of the Crown to disclose relevant information to the accused. 53 But again this involves a decision by the Crown to withhold information that it would otherwise disclose; it does not extend to the actual use of secret evidence at trial. 51 On US approaches to confidential informers in criminal and national security proceedings, see Moreover, the ECtHR and English domestic courts have placed a series of restrictions on the assertion of the privilege in order to ensure the right to a fair and public hearing in criminal cases. In particular, the ECtHR concluded in Rowe and Davis that the restriction on the rights of the defence must be "strictly necessary" and that any difficulties caused to the defence must be sufficiently counterbalanced by the adoption of adequate procedural safeguards. 54 Also, the ECtHR found non-compliant a procedure in which "the prosecution itself attempts to assess the importance of concealed information to the defence and weigh this against the public interest in keeping the information secret".
Importantly, it was up to the judge at trial to determine issues of relevance and disclosure because it was the trial judge "who saw the witnesses give their testimony and was fully versed in all the evidence and issues in the case" and because he or she "would have been in a position to monitor the need for disclosure throughout the trial, assessing the importance of the undisclosed evidence at a stage when new issues were emerging". 
The absence of the public
Alongside limitations arising from the absence of the individual is the obvious corollary that the public also has no access to closed proceedings. The absence of the public is a significant limitation. 56 It raises accountability concerns in general and more specifically in security-related proceedings where secrecy is necessarily pervasive and typically permanent. First, keeping evidence secret means that witnesses will not testify, and government counsel will not present argument, under public scrutiny and third parties who may have relevant information -but who will be able to come forward only if made 54 Rowe and Davis, above n. 52 at para 61. 55 Rowe and Davis, above n. 52 at para 65. 56 Marcus, above n. 16 at 207-208.
aware of the evidence -cannot do so. 57 This poses a risk beyond that present in open proceedings that the adjudicative decision will be founded on incomplete or inaccurate information. Revealing the evidence to a representative of the individual (or to the individual himself or herself) on condition of confidentiality does not address this concern because it precludes third parties from being informed in follow-up investigations.
Second, the absence of the public hampers the judge's ability to look behind the state's case against the individual and its reasons for secrecy. The need for systematic secrecy means that courts are less able to hear from independent experts, for the simple reason that few outside government are able to develop sophisticated and well-informed expertise in the field. There are experts, often retired security officials, who can offer expertise that is informed by extensive experience in the work and techniques of security intelligence. But this expertise remains concentrated in a small group of persons who have past connections to government. Even where a particular expert independent of the security agencies is called to testify on the evidence and the rationales for secrecy in a particular case, the expert will be shut out from the closed loop of up-to-date information, examined with reference to other live intelligence files, that is available to the insider.
The executive becomes by default the judge's guide to the murky world of security intelligence, 58 tasked with outlining the state's current priorities in relation to the case against the individual, its information-sharing practices, the motivations of foreign governments, the strengths and weaknesses of its investigative techniques, and so on.
This of course does not mean that sensitive information should be released in order to support the development of a wider base of expertise on security intelligence. But it does indicate that secrecy in the security context has wider implications for adjudicative decision-making over and above its impact on the instant case. A second set of limitations arises from the courts' dependence on the executive, above all its security arm, to be fair and forthcoming in supplying confidential information, in depicting how the information was acquired and selected for presentation to the court, and in producing all information in the state's custody that may be beneficial to the individual. In a closed proceeding, the judge is not in a position to review the underlying record of information held by the executive. As a result, greater opportunities arise for error or abuse than in cases where a more extensive duty of disclosure applies or where alternative, independent means of investigation are available. its way through the security apparatus of other states 66 and may not be privy to the foreign policy motivations and machinations of the foreign government. 67 The court cannot call foreign officials to testify and is unlikely to hear testimony from, or even to know the identity of, informers abroad. The court is thus seriously hampered in its ability to probe the executive's case.
The court in the receiving state relies in closed hearings on its own government and, especially, on the agencies that deal regularly in the information exchange in security matters. But those agencies have wider relationships with other governments that they must cultivate as part of their mandate to collect useful information. An agency's responsibility to serve the court may be important, but it remains one consideration alongside others in the agency's pursuit of its mission to identify and protect against threats. In the course of this mission, individuals may become useful bargaining chips in international dealings with other entities. 68 Alternatively, a security agency may be reluctant to question before a court the reliability or motivations of foreign governments with which it has an on-going relationship, especially after the agency has chosen to put before the court information from that government. In these respects, a judge may not fully appreciate the exigencies of its security agencies' dealings with a foreign government that has supplied secret evidence.
Another danger is that officials from different states could seek to manipulate information exchange in order to construct rationales for secrecy in each other's jurisdictions.
Because it is the executive that initiates proceedings against the individual, while also deciding how its information sharing arrangements are constructed and negotiated, the court should not extend blanket protections from disclosure to foreign-sourced information nor should it lower evidentiary standards that otherwise apply to the types of evidence proffered. Doing so opens the door to the artificial use of foreign caveats as a vehicle to inoculate information against disclosure and against the rigours of the ordinary legal process. Likewise, where the executive proposes to use foreign-sourced information as secret evidence, the court should hold the executive to a reasonable duty to negotiate with the providing state in order to maximize disclosure. 69 The executive's decision to agree to a caveat when receiving foreign information could also be taken as an election to limit the extent to which such information can be introduced in an adjudicative process against an individual. The integrity of adjudication requires that information-sharing be adapted to the demands of accuracy and fairness, not the other way around.
The decision in Charkaoui No. 2
The Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged limitations arising from judicial dependence on the executive and took steps to address them in Charkaoui No. 2. 70 The case involved the use of secret evidence that originated in operational activities of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). Mr. Charkaoui, a permanent resident of Canada, had been detained for 21 months pursuant to a security certificate. Prior to a fourth judicial review of his detention, the government revealed that a document that should have been disclosed to the court when the security certificate was issued had not been disclosed due to an oversight. The document was a CSIS report summarizing two CSIS interviews with Mr. Charkaoui that took place prior to his detention. In reply to Mr.
Charkaoui's request for disclosure of the notes and recordings of the interviews, the government stated that there were no recordings on file and that notes of CSIS interviews are, based on CSIS policy, systematically destroyed after the CSIS officer completes his or her report. Thus, the judge reviewing Mr. Charkaoui's detention would have to rely on interview summaries prepared by executive officials.
In these circumstances, the Supreme Court found that CSIS breached its duties under the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and under s 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to retain all of the information in its possession relating to security certificate investigations and to disclose that information to relevant ministers and the reviewing judge. LeBel and Fish JJ stated for a unanimous Court that submission of the operational notes of CSIS officers to the court "may be necessary to ensure that a complete and objective version of the facts is available to those responsible for issuing and reviewing the certificate". 71 They concluded also that "[i]f the original evidence was destroyed, the designated judge has access only to summaries prepared by the state, which means that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to verify the allegations" against the individual. It followed that "the destruction by CSIS officers of their operational notes compromises the very function of judicial review". 72 These concerns reflect the wider limitations arising from judicial dependence on the executive in closed proceedings, which are further explored in the next section of this article.
C. The dynamic of closed proceedings
Closed proceedings in the security context have a dynamic that is unlike other confidential adjudication owing to a combination of factors that may encourage the courts, sometimes in subtle ways, to favour unduly the executive's position over that of the individual. This tendency is in part the outcome of the two factors previously discussed -the absence of the individual and the public, and the courts' dependence on 71 Charkaoui No. 2, above n. 18 at para 42. 72 Charkaoui No. 2, above n. 18 at para 61-2.
the executive -both of which contribute to an adjudicative environment in which the security interest obtains a privileged status as a result of its more direct and responsive representation before the court. Besides this, a judge may lean toward the executive's position for more diffuse reasons arising from the dynamic of closed proceedings and from the type of issues that arise in confidentiality review.
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The atmosphere of closed hearings
In the first place, closed hearings have a unique tone and atmosphere that reflects the priorities and culture of the security realm. This realm is populated by officials whose raison d'être is to identify and counter security threats and whose training and professional experience understandably press them to emphasize secrecy over disclosure, and expediency over concerns to protect the administration of justice. Other than the judge and a handful of court staff, closed hearings will be attended by government counsel, government witnesses, and government observers who are all drawn from or connected to the security realm. Other than the judge, the only experts (legal and nonlegal) in the room in which the hearing takes place will have exclusive access to and control over the background information and underlying record for the case. Thus, they will have incomparably specialized expertise in the most arcane of fields. 74 In these respects, the executive's presence looms large, both physically and psychologically, as a constant reminder of the security interest.
This environment need not influence the judge in an overt or conscious way, but it may contribute over time to a dynamic in which security and secrecy crowd out other priorities. 75 One need not suspect that security officials have actively misled a judge in a particular case in order to accept that judicial review of the executive in these matters is shaped by how security officials present their activities and vet the information they collect before putting it before the court, and by their own vulnerability to errors that an 73 Margulies, above n. 59 at 459. 74 Margulies, above n. 59 at 465. 75 Leigh, above n. 8 at 159.
open process would otherwise deter or uncover. 76 Even where a judge is not swayed by "nightmarish tales of national security problems", 77 he or she must confront serious obstacles to peeling away any layers of obfuscation or to uncovering any subtle bending of the truth on the part of security officials.
Lack of judicial expertise
A key reason for the courts' hesitancy to question the executive, especially in its characterization of the implications of disclosure of confidential information, is the reviewing court's acknowledged lack of pertinent expertise. It is a very complex task to evaluate confidential information or intelligence, predict how its release may harm the security interest, weigh this risk against the need for openness and fairness, devise ways to maximize disclosure without allowing the intricacies of document review to overwhelm the adjudicative process, and regulate compliance by the executive with court orders to release information. Each of these elements of the process may in turn engage wide-ranging issues such as the novelty of investigative techniques, the effectiveness of data-mining software, the conditions of a witness' imprisonment in a foreign country, the motivations of a foreign agency to share information, the immutability of governmental caveats, and so on.
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In examining these issues, a court must be sensitive to challenges faced by the security The mosaic theory
In terms of expertise, the terrain of inquiry in national security matters has an especially opaque and high stakes quality. Threats are often not clear even to security officials and yet can easily be seen by the judge to carry potentially catastrophic consequences. This high stakes uncertainty provides the backdrop for the "mosaic theory" of non-disclosure.
The theory posits that, even where apparently innocuous information is disclosed, an informed observer may be able to piece together information or combine it with other information known to the observer in order to construct a more comprehensive picture of Following a detailed review, Mosley J ordered disclosure of the information that he found to be relevant to the extradition proceeding, including the payment of the bounty. The court found that disclosure of this fact, in particular, would not injure national security because three years had passed since the information was received by Canadian officials, the general practice of paying bounties was in the public domain, no human source 88 Khadr, above n. 69 at para 73. indicates not only the limits of the mosaic theory as an all-encompassing rationale for confidentiality, but also the capacity of judges to reject over-broad claims about the need for secrecy. On the other hand, aspects of the decision in Khadr are somewhat exceptional, for reasons discussed below.
The contest of attrition in security confidentiality review
A judge is usually in a position to release confidential information only after a timeconsuming and often testing interaction with the executive in secret. 95 The process of confidential document review is complex and laborious. Myriad issues will arise in the assessment of the relevance of information to the underlying proceeding, the potential harm arising from disclosure, and the trade-offs between secrecy and disclosure. These issues will be multiplied by the number of distinct pieces of information that are under 92 Khadr, above n. 69 at para 111. Other information relevant to Mr. Khadr's defence in the extradition proceedings was also ordered to be disclosed to him, although not to the public, on the basis that the public interest in this restricted disclosure outweighed the public interest in keeping it secret. 93 Khadr, above n. 69 at para 77. 94 Khadr, above n. 69 at para 77. consideration for disclosure. The relationship between reasons for and against disclosure may be fluid, requiring on-going review as risks evolve or other information finds its way into the public domain. The process will be cumbersome, all the more so where the executive adopts the strategy of embroiling the judge or special advocate in a contest of attrition. 96 In such circumstances, there is a danger that the judge, facing a long and arduous struggle with the executive, will be discouraged from undertaking the meticulous scrutiny that is required to maximize disclosure. 97 He or she may be induced to opt for secrecy as the most practical way to contend with a seemingly endless stream of objections by the executive.
The Khadr decision is encouraging in this respect, inasmuch as Mosley J ordered extensive disclosure of information to support Mr. Khadr's defence in extradition proceedings. That said, the amount of information at stake was not overwhelming; it consisted of 266 documents comprising approximately 1300 pages in total. 98 Mosley J expressed concern about "the length of time that it took to complete the review of the material for disclosure purposes" but accepted that this was "a function of the sensitivity of the information and insufficient resources". He also noted that Crown counsel in the extradition proceeding "voluntarily undertook to make disclosure beyond the scope of the requesting state's Record of the Case when they recognized that there was an 'air of reality' to the applicant's claims". 99 Lastly, both counsel to Mr. Khadr and the special advocate appointed by Mosley J in the case were able to make relatively well-informed submissions on disclosure because much of the information had been previously (and, according to the Attorney General, inadvertently) disclosed to Mr. Khadr -and in one instance to a newspaper -in the course of the extradition proceeding. 100 These pre-existing revelations enhanced the adversarial character of the closed proceedings in
Khadr and may have helped to counter other pressures tending to favour secrecy.
Conclusion
Three weaknesses of adjudication in the face of secret evidence have been elaborated: the inability of the individual to make an informed reply to the state's case, the unique dependence of the court (and the individual) on the executive, and the dynamic of closed hearings that tends to favour the security interest. These limitations may be intractable, especially when secret evidence originates in foreign-sourced information. Executive reliance on such information enmeshes the court in a web of dependencies on persons and organizations operating beyond its authority and, in many cases, beyond proper scrutiny by its own security agencies. In the face of these weaknesses, various procedural adaptations may assist in ameliorating the limitations of secret evidence so long as they are designed and evaluated in light of the full range of relevant adjudicative weaknesses, and take appropriate account of the variable characteristics of specific procedural contexts.
To address the absence of the individual from closed proceedings, governments in the UK and Canada have allowed for the appointment of special advocates who are given access to all of the information put forward by the state, and to the closed hearings, and who are mandated to represent the individual's interests. 101 This allows for a line to be drawn between the judge's role and the individual's interests, and operates as a check Review Committee (SIRC) and by the Arar Inquiry to look behind executive claims and scrutinize the underlying record. 106 Notably, both of these alternative models allowed not only for surrogate representation of the individual in closed proceedings but also for independent review of the executive's decisions regarding the selection and depiction of secret evidence. 107 The models also have limitations, but they were in this respect better equipped than the special advocates model to counter weaknesses arising from dependence on the executive. In security proceedings, there is a uniquely pressing need for independent investigation of the underlying record because the material that makes up the secret evidence will rarely be made public to contemporaries or otherwise scrutinized beyond the closed proceeding.
In conclusion, it should be stressed that no procedural adaptation can entirely remove the inherent weaknesses arising from secrecy. Allowing secret evidence poses an inescapable risk that the court may be denied vital information that can be communicated only if the affected individual, or the public, is informed of the evidence. Likewise, the only way to subject those operating in closed proceedings to the disciplines of publicity is to open the proceedings. For these reasons, the courts must always ask whether, in spite of the procedural adaptations that may be available to accommodate secrecy, it is nonetheless irreparably unsafe or unfair to allow it. 106 Above n. 31 at para 70 and 87. 107 See Arar Report -Analysis and Recommendations, above n. 61 at 290-298; Leigh, above n. 8
at 140-141 and 162-163.
